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INTRODUCTION 
Any business with global operations is bound to have considered the 
purchase of a political risk insurance (PRI) policy.  A PRI policy insures a 
beneficiary’s property in the country specified in the policy against three 
primary risks—expropriation, currency inconvertibility, and political 
violence1—providing enormous value to the beneficiary.  A beneficiary can 
insure almost anything, tangible (e.g. production facilities) or intangible 
(e.g. future cash flows), if it understands the availability and variety of 
 
Copyright © 2015 by James J. Waters. 
*Associate, Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina; Duke University School of 
Law, J.D./LL.M in International and Comparative Law, summa cum laude, 2014; University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, B.S. in Mathematical Decision Science, 2010. The author has previously 
worked for the Nicaraguan National Commission of Free Trade Zones in Managua, Nicaragua, as a 
statistical and economic adviser, an experience that exposed him to the importance of political risk 
management in global business operations. 
 1.  See infra Part I. 
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public and private PRI options. And it’s not only global business 
powerhouses that participate in the PRI market.  An ever-increasing 
number of small and medium sized businesses are quickly seeing the value 
of PRI policies to their global operations. 
Take, for example, the American International School of Bamako, 
Mali.  On March 24, 2012, the BBC News reported that a group of 
mutinous soldiers were “in complete control” of Mali’s government after 
having overthrown the country’s elected leader.2  With the whereabouts of 
the elected president unknown, Bamako, the capital of Mali, descended into 
a scene of widespread pillaging, looting, and vandalism.3 But the American 
International School of Bamako did not need to see news reports to grasp 
the magnitude of the coup.  The school had a total of 206 students enrolled 
on March 20, 2012, but the number of students actually attending class 
dwindled to 117 by April 2.4  Two days later, on April 4, there were just 88 
students present.5 Unable to operate, the school closed its doors, evacuated 
its teachers and their families, and decided to try to re-open in August for 
the new academic year.6  When the school re-opened its doors in August of 
2012, only 95 students enrolled.7  As a result of the military coup, the 
American International School lost over $1.5 million in tuition income,8 
and incurred over $26,000 in evacuation expenses.9 
Fortunately, the American International School had insured its 
investment with political risk insurance through the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC). Knowing that doing business in Mali 
contained inherent political risks that could jeopardize the business, the 
school had purchased PRI covering losses of business income up to $2 
million as well as evacuation expenses caused by political violence.10  
Under this policy, the school recovered over $1.3 million from OPIC for its 
loss of business income and evacuation expenses,11 demonstrating the 
 
 2.  Mali Coup Leader Amadou Sanogo “in complete control,” BBC WORLD NEWS (Mar. 24, 
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17498739. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. CORP., MEMORANDUM OF DETERMINATIONS, POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
CLAIM OF THE AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF BAMAKO FOUNDATION, INC. 2 (2013), available 
at http://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/files/mali-claims-02052013.pdf [hereinafter OPIC AIS 
MEMORANDUM OF DETERMINATIONS] 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. at 2–3. 
 7.  Id. at 3. 
 8.  Id. at 9. 
 9.  Id. at 6–9. 
 10.  Id. at 3. 
 11.  Id. at 10. 
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prudence of purchasing a PRI policy in regions with elevated levels of 
instability. 
Unsurprisingly, then, the importance of PRI policies—like those 
purchased by the American International School—is rising among foreign 
investors.  The number of policies issued increased by 13% in 2011, hitting 
a record number, with more records forecast in the coming years.12  The 
use of PRI among investors, however, still has plenty of room to grow; 
only 18% of firms use PRI as a risk mitigation tool.13  This also implies that 
any analysis of the use of PRI in mitigating risk must also consider its 
compatibility with other tools for managing risk.14  Additionally, the 
growth in PRI policy issuance has been outpacing the growth of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), indicating that the importance of PRI is only likely 
to grow.15 And as the American International School’s experience 
demonstrates, PRI is not only for gigantic corporations but also for 
relatively small investors as well.16  In fact, agencies such as OPIC have 
“no minimum investment size requirement,” making PRI available to even 
the smallest of investors.17 
Both public and private entities offer PRI policies.  Some national 
governments have established agencies to provide PRI policies to their 
constituent businesses.  Japan, for example, has established the Nippon 
Export and Investment Insurance Agency (NEXI) to offer PRI policies to 
Japanese businesses.18  The United States established OPIC in 1971 to offer 
a variety of risk mitigation tools to U.S. businesses and individuals, as well 
as advance social and economic development in developing countries.19  
Multilateral agencies, too, such as the World Bank Group’s Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), offer PRI policies to investors of 
member countries that invest in other developing member countries.20 
 
 12.  MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR. AGENCY, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, 2012 World Investment 
and Political Risk  9, available at http://www.miga.org/documents/WIPR12.pdf [hereinafter MIGA 
2012 Political Risk Report]. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Among the other tools of risk mitigation that are more popular with foreign investors than 
PRI include forming joint ventures with local partners, keeping “informal relationships with political 
leaders” warm, promoting engagement with local communities, and conducting scenario planning.  Id. 
at 10, fig.3. 
 15.  Id. at 41. 
 16. OPIC AIS MEMORANDUM OF DETERMINATIONS, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that The American 
International School’s investment was only roughly $4.4 million). 
 17.  OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. CORP. HANDBOOK 37 (2015), available at http://www.opic.gov/ 
sites/default/files/docs/OPIC_Handbook.pdf [hereinafter OPIC HANDBOOK] 
 18.  See infra Part I.B. 
 19.  OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 4. 
 20.  Id. 
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This Article chooses depth over breadth by focusing particularly on 
the relative utilities of public and private PRI. To help an investor-company 
select a PRI policy that is tailored to its particular investment projects, this 
Article comparatively analyzes public and private PRI policies and the 
advantages and disadvantages of each type of policy.  An awareness of the 
relative utilities of public and private PRI is particularly important because 
multinational enterprises plan to boost their investments in developing 
countries over the next three years.21  The Article then uses its comparative 
analysis to make recommendations for how investors can mitigate their 
exposure to political risk. 
The analysis proceeds in three Parts.  Part I introduces the market for 
PRI with a focus on what is most important for investors choosing 
insurance policies.  Part I.A acquaints readers with the types of political 
risks that insurance policies typically cover.  Part I.B gives an overview of 
the market for public PRI, focusing on the important market insurers, 
eligibility requirements for receiving a public PRI policy, and the 
substantive provisions of those insurance policies.  Part I.C does the same 
for the private market. 
Part II then moves from the descriptive to the normative, arguing that 
both advantages and disadvantages exist to both public and private PRI 
policies that investors must consider before making a decision. In 
particular, Part II.A argues that the advantages of low public insurance 
premiums must be weighed against increased monitoring and reporting 
obligations of beneficiaries, while Part II.B argues that the benefits of 
speed and more personalized policies in the private PRI market must be 
weighed against the diminished political clout that private insurance 
companies carry with host governments when compared to their public 
counterparts. 
Part III then sets forth two recommendations for investors.  Part III.A 
argues that public PRI, when available, is preferable to private PRI.  Part 
III.B then argues that investors can likely lower their PRI premiums by 
strategically engaging with host communities and host governments.  A 
conclusion follows. 
 
 21.  See MIGA 2012 Political Risk Report, supra note 12, at 17 (“The share of [multinational 
enterprises] that intend to expand into developing countries in the following three years jumps to 70 
percent compared with 52 percent in the short term . . . .”); see id. (indicating that investors are 
prioritizing investment in developing countries due to “large and growing consumer markets”). 
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I. A PRIMER ON POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE 
A. The role of PRI for foreign investors 
To clearly distinguish PRI from commercial risk insurance (CRI), it is 
important to note that PRI covers risks that are generally separate from 
those insured by CRI.  Risks covered by CRI include construction and 
operational risks, such as the delayed completion of a project, excessive 
maintenance costs, and insufficient sales to pay interest on a debt.22  PRI, 
by contrast, covers non-commercial risks associated with a host 
government’s actions that result in an investment loss.23  PRI generally 
covers the risks of expropriation, currency inconvertibility, and political 
violence.24  Some risks, however, are non-insurable by the major public 
insurers, including currency devaluation risk, risks from inflation, and non-
discriminatory regulation.25 Each of the three insurable risks will be 
addressed in turn. 
Expropriation risk includes both the risk of direct expropriation 
through seizure or nationalization of a business, as well as indirect 
expropriation through adverse regulatory changes that “deprive the owner 
of its ability to manage, use, or control its property in a meaningful way.”26  
In addition, a series of increasingly encroaching government regulations 
can compound over time to constitute a “creeping expropriation.”27 The 
risks of expropriation are becoming “more prevalent,”28 and the number of 
direct expropriations in particular has been increasing over the past 
decade,29 underscoring the potential benefits of PRI.  While there is “no 
 
 22.  HOSSEIN RAZAVI, FINANCING ENERGY PROJECTS IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 128 (1996). 
 23.  Id.; see also Pieter Bekker & Akiko Ogawa, The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) 
Proliferation on Demand for Investment Insurance: Reassessing Political Risk Insurance After the ‘BIT 
Bang,’ 28 ICSID REVIEW 314, 316–317 (2013) (noting elements of PRI policies as “length of coverage, 
the amount of compensation, and . . . the standards required to find State liability”). 
 24.  Bekker & Ogawa, supra note 23, at 318; KAUSAR HAMDANI, ELISE LIEBERS & GEORGE 
ZANJANI, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., AN OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE 2 (2005), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs22fedny3.pdf. 
 25.  Bekker & Ogawa, supra note 23, at 323. 
 26.  UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II, 
EXPROPRIATION 6 (2012), available at www.unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaia2011d7_en.pdf  
[hereinafter UNCTAD] 
 27.  Id. at 11. 
 28.  MIGA 2012 Political Risk Report, supra note 12, at 20. 
 29.  MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR. AGENCY, 2011 REPORT ON WORLD INVESTMENT AND POLITICAL 
RISK 30, fig. 2.1, available at http://www.miga.org/documents/WIPR11.pdf (demonstrating that 
expropriations have risen since the early 2000s, albeit being far below the peak of expropriations in the 
1960s and 1970s) [hereinafter MIGA 2011 Political Risk Report]. 
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uniform definition” of indirect expropriation,30 it is important to note that at 
least one public insurer, OPIC, has been more willing than arbitral tribunals 
operating under a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) to find that an indirect 
expropriation took place,31 suggesting that PRI may provide more favorable 
substantive protection than investment treaties with respect to expropriation 
claims.32 
The second category of insurable risk—currency inconvertibility—is 
the “risk of losses arising from an investor’s inability to convert local 
currency into foreign exchange for transfer outside the host country.”33  
Host governments could trigger an insurance payment for this risk if it 
prohibits, for example, currency conversions or remittances,34 thereby 
“freez[ing] the investor’s income derived from investment.”35  A host 
government’s motivation for prohibiting currency conversions could be to 
protect its balance-of-payments or conserve foreign currency.36 
OPIC regularly pays claims of currency incontrovertibility in the form 
of paying the beneficiary an amount of U.S. dollars that the beneficiary 
would have had absent the government regulations.37  Successful claims for 
currency inconvertibility only require that (1) the investor took all 
reasonable steps to transfer currency, (2) the investor could not do so 
because of government regulations, and (3) that the host government 
promulgated those regulations after the issuance of the PRI policy.38  PRI is 
especially useful for investors facing substantial currency risks because no 
international arbitral tribunal has ever addressed an incontrovertibility 
claim, adding uncertainty to the law and making the relative certainty of 
PRI policies attractive.39  This is especially important given that over 20% 
of firms responding to the MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey either 
 
 30.  UNCTAD, supra note 26, at 57. 
 31.  Bekker & Ogawa, supra note 23, at 330. 
 32.  The fact that PRI providers may be more liberal with finding indirect expropriation, however, 
does not necessarily mean a higher level of overall protection, as protections such as the fair and 
equitable treatment standard take may only be available in BITs and not in PRI policies. 
 33.  MIGA 2011 Political Risk Report, supra note 29, at 21, available at http://www.miga.org/ 
documents/WIPR11.pdf. 
 34. What We Offer: Currency Inconvertability, OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. CORP., http://www.opic. 
gov/what-we-offer/political-risk-insurance/types-of-coverage/currency-inconvertability (last visited 
May 17, 2015). 
 35.  Bekker & Ogawa, supra note 23, at 319. 
 36.  See id. at 335 (“Developing countries often face balance-of-payments difficulties and must 
conserve foreign currency to pay for essential goods and services.”). 
 37.  See Currency Inconvertability, supra note 34. 
 38.  Bekker & Ogawa, supra note 23, at 335.  An additional regulation is that the currency held by 
the beneficiary was obtained within the last 18 months.  See id. at 335, n.141. 
 39.  Id. at 335. 
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withdrew or cancelled investments from 2011–2012 on account of currency 
convertibility risks.40 
Lastly, PRI policies insure against losses arising from political 
violence, which can include civil wars, domestic unrest, and revolutions, 
among other types of civil strife. Publicly available claim determinations 
from OPIC demonstrate that the agency regularly pays political violence 
claims. Illustrative examples include the payment of $68,202 to the 
International Rescue Committee in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
for property damaged during firefights between the Congolese Army and 
rebel groups,41 the payment of $1,384,871 to the American International 
School in Mali to cover evacuation expenses and lost tuition income 
resulting from the military’s overthrow of the elected government,42 and 
the payment of $38,027 to a company in Zambia after political protects 
resulted in damage to its physical property.43 
Given the rise in expropriation and political violence, it is 
unsurprising, then, that “investors continue to rank political risk as a key 
obstacle to investing in developing countries.”44 In fact, investors label 
political risk—particularly risks from regulatory changes or breaches of 
contracts—as “the most significant constraint to investing in developing 
countries.”45 According to Lloyd’s Risk Index, high taxation and 
excessively strict regulation are two of the top five risks that investors face 
globally, but especially in developing countries.46  That 97% of senior 
executives labeled managing political risk as important to their business 
strategy only begins to show PRI’s importance.47  A full 42% of surveyed 
executives stated that their risk management process was “not integrated as 
 
 40.  See  MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR. AGENCY, The World Bank Group, 2012 MIGA-EU Political 
Risk Survey 58–79 (2013), available at http://www.miga.org/documents/WIPR12.pdf. 
 41.  See OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. CORP., MEMORANDUM OF DETERMINATIONS, POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE CLAIM OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE 1 (Jan. 14, 2009), available at 
http://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/docs/international_rescue_ommittee_droc_2009.PDF. 
 42.  See OPIC AIS MEMORANDUM OF DETERMINATIONS, supra note 4, at 1. 
 43.  OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. CORP., MEMORANDUM OF DETERMINATIONS, POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
CLAIM OF SEABOARD OVERSEAS LTD. 1 (Apr. 2, 2012), available at http://www.opic.gov/sites/default/ 
files/files/seaboard-overseas-limited-zambia.pdf. 
 44.  MIGA 2012 Political Risk Report, supra note 12, at 1. 
 45.  Id. at 7. 
 46.  LLOYD’S, LLOYD’S RISK INDEX 2013 7 (2013), available at http://www.lloyds.com/~/media/ 
Files/News%20and%20Insight/Risk%20Insight/Risk%20Index%202013/Report/Lloyds%20Risk%20In
dex%202013report100713.pdf. 
 47.  PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS ADVISORY AND EURASIA GROUP, HOW MANAGING POLITICAL 
RISK IMPROVES GLOBAL BUSINESS PERFORMANCE 34 (2006), available at http://www.pwc. 
com/us/en/risk-compliance/assets/PwC_PoliticalRisk_052006.pdf. 
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effectively as it could be,”48 further demonstrating the need to develop risk 
mitigation strategies using PRI. 
The supply of PRI is also increasing.49  The supply of private PRI in 
particular is currently experiencing an uptick because chronically low 
interest rates have pushed insurance companies to seek higher rates of 
return elsewhere, in part by expanding their PRI offerings.50  In addition, 
private PRI issuance continues to increase as the private sector develops the 
expertise necessary to compete with its more seasoned public 
counterparts.51 
In sum, PRI policies play a vital role by covering increasingly 
important risks associated with doing business globally.  Though public 
issuers have traditionally dominated the PRI industry, the increased 
expertise of private players and their heightened willingness to compete in 
the industry indicates that investors now have multiple options when 
purchasing PRI. 
B. Public PRI 
The market for public PRI is comprised of national actors, such as 
OPIC in the United States and NEXI in Japan, as well as multilateral 
agencies such as MIGA, the African Trade Insurance Agency, the Inter-
American Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank.52  While 
governments can delegate their public insurance programs to private 
entities, as Germany and France have done, this is not the norm.53  This 
Section discusses the role of a few public PRI actors, including their 
eligibility requirements as well as their policies’ substantive provisions. 
National insurance agencies focus on providing insurance products to 
their constituent entities.  NEXI, for example, only provides overseas 
investment insurance to Japanese companies.54  NEXI has typically catered 
 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  See MIGA 2012 Political Risk Report, supra note 12, at 40 (“The growth in PRI has involved 
both public and private providers . . . .  [C]apacity has increased 19 percent in the first half of 2012, 
with new providers entering the market and existing providers increasing their capacity.”). 
 50.  Id. at 11. 
 51.  See Bekker & Ogawa, supra note 23, at 349 (noting the increased sophistication of private 
PRI providers due to “the enhanced . . . ability of private political risk insurers to sort risks and to do 
business in a competitive way.”). 
 52.  See id. at 320, n.32. 
 53.  Opening Trade and Investment to the Private Sector, INST. FOR INT’L STUDIES AND TRAINING 
(Mar. 15, 2005), http://www.iist.or.jp/wf/magazine/0330/0330_E.html. 
 54.  See Overseas Investment Insurance, NIPPON EXPORT AND INV. INS., http://www.nexi.go.jp/en/ 
products/types/investment/ (last visited May 17, 2015) (“This insurance covers losses suffered by a 
Japanese company with a subsidiary or a joint venture in a foreign country.”). 
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to large businesses, but it recently began initiatives to open investment 
insurance to small- and medium-sized enterprises by forming partnerships 
with twenty-nine Asian regional banks.55  NEXI is not pressured to make a 
profit; rather, it must only operate on a break-even basis,56 allowing it to 
reduce its premium rates for insurance, particularly for small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs).57 Australia’s Export Finance and Insurance 
Corporation (EFIC) also restricts its insurance to domestic companies and 
has the added requirement of restricting its insurance to investors making 
new investments, forcing the investor to decide whether to purchase PRI 
before embarking on a new investment or project.58  The EFIC does, 
however, allow for insurance purchases for new expansions of existing 
investments.59 
OPIC restricts its services to only “U.S. investors, contractors, 
exporters and financial institutions involved in international transactions.”60  
Congress mandated that OPIC work to promote the development goals of 
the United States, stating that its goal in creating OPIC was “[t]o mobilize 
and facilitate the participation of United States private capital and skills in 
the economic and social development of less developed countries . . . 
thereby complementing the development assistance objectives of the 
United States.”61  To that end, Congress set forth various criteria that 
OPIC’s managers must consider when deciding whether to provide PRI to a 
company or project. Among these criteria are the “economic and social 
development impact” of the project, whether the project will benefit an 
especially poor country, and whether the project will comport with 
environmental standards.62 
 
 55.  See Message from the Chairman, NIPPON EXPORT AND INV. INS., http://www.nexi.go.jp/en/ 
corporate/message/ (last visited May 17, 2015) (“NEXI is supporting overseas business of regional 
SMEs by using a support network between NEXI and 29 regional banks based on service agreement to 
diffuse the use of NEXI insurance.”). 
 56.  About Trade Insurance, NIPPON EXPORT AND INV. INS., http://www.nexi.go.jp/en/products/ 
(last visited May 17, 2015). NEXI does not have to make profit under the Trade and Investment Law 
and the Trade Reinsurance Special Account Law. Id. 
 57.  See Message from the Chairman, supra note 55. 
 58.  See Political Risk Insurance for Investors, EXPORT FIN. & INS. CORP., http://www.efic.gov. 
au/client-solutions/individual-solution-pages/political-risk-insurance/ (last visited May 17, 2015). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 17. 
 61.  22 U.S.C. § 2191 (2006). 
 62.  See 22 U.S.C. § 2191(1)–(3) (2006). The statute stipulates that “preferential consideration” 
shall be given to countries with per capita income of less than $984 in 1986 U.S. dollars, and that OPIC 
should limit its assistance to projects in countries with per capita incomes above $4,269 in 1986 U.S. 
dollars. 22 U.S.C. § 2191(2) (2006). Congress expresses its desire in the statute to have OPIC grant at 
least thirty percent of its insurance policies to small businesses. 22 U.S.C. § 2191(2). 
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OPIC’s policies also contain other limitations that are typical of public 
insurers. It sets upper limits, for example, on the amount of investment 
insured.  OPIC insures investments only up to $250 million, but special 
treatment is given to oil and gas projects, which can receive up to $400 
million.63  There is not, however, a minimum investment size, which opens 
up OPIC insurance to even the smallest of investors.  OPIC will also only 
cover up to 90% of the investment loss.64  This limitation makes sense.  
Insuring the investment for only 90% of its value will give the investor an 
incentive to protect its investment despite having PRI, as the investor 
would still presumably lose 10% of the investment if it were, for instance, 
expropriated. 
Multilateral agencies such as MIGA serve many of the same purposes 
as national agencies but are available to all its member countries.  MIGA 
offers PRI to 179 World Bank members.65  Given its broad membership, it 
is unsurprising that it insured a total of $2.8 billion against political risk in 
2013 alone,66 in many cases “mak[ing] the difference between a go and a 
no-go decision” for the investors.67  MIGA insures up to $220 million per 
project, and can insure up to $720 million per country, thus capping its risk 
exposure in any single country.68  In contrast to OPIC, MIGA does insure 
existing investments if the investor demonstrates a long-term commitment 
to the project.69 
MIGA also has more restrictive eligibility requirements than many 
national public agencies.  MIGA has three main eligibility requirements: 
(1) investors must be citizens or entities of a MIGA member making an 
investment in a developing MIGA member,70 (2) the host country must 
have a bilateral investment treaty, protection for the investment through 
local laws, or a protection agreement with MIGA,71 and (3) the investment 
 
 63.  OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 16. The preference for oil and gas projects may be 
because these projects likely have the potential to generate substantial income, thereby reducing the risk 
in the project and allowing OPIC to therefore invest more money in it. See id. 
 64.  Id. at 28. 
 65.  MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR. AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 2013 7 (2013), available at 
http://www.miga.org/documents/Annual_Report13.pdf. 
 66.  Id. at 2. 
 67.  Id. at 14. 
 68. Frequently Asked Questions, Project and Country Limits, MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR. 
AGENCY, http://www.miga.org/whoweare/index.cfm?stid=1792#con4 (last visited May 17, 2015). 
 69.  Investment Guarantees: Eligibility, MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR. AGENCY, http://www.miga. 
org/investmentguarantees/index.cfm?stid=1798 (last visited May 17, 2015). 
 70.  See id. (“MIGA insures cross-border investments made by investors in a MIGA member 
country into a developing member country.”). 
 71.  Bekker & Ogawa, supra note 23, at 322. 
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must meet a variety of social and environmental development goals.72  The 
requirement to have a BIT or some other form of local statutory or 
contractual protection is a requirement not found in many national agencies 
and provides a benefit to countries with BITs. 
MIGA’s social and environmental standards naturally bring the 
investor together with the World Bank’s goal of reducing poverty.  One 
requirement for PRI through MIGA, for instance, requires the investor to 
consult with local communities when they “may be affected by risks or 
adverse impacts from a project,”73 thus helping ensure positive community 
relations as well as potentially reducing the risk of expropriation by 
strengthening the investor’s community ties. 
The publicly available model insurance contract of MIGA provides a 
window into the substantive insurance policies of public actors.  MIGA 
defines an expropriation event as an act or series of acts which “deprives or 
prevents the Guarantee Holder from exercising its ownership rights in, or 
effective control of, all or a substantial portion of the Guaranteed 
Investment,” or that deprives the Guarantee Holder of a “substantial 
benefit . . . constituting a fundamental right essential to the [investment’s] 
overall financial viability.”74  Given that the broad language of only 
requiring a loss of a “substantial portion” of the investment or losing a 
“substantial benefit” from it, it is unsurprising that some scholars have 
argued that MIGA is more likely than arbitral tribunals to deem 
expropriation claims valid.75  Expropriation losses, however, do not 
translate into expropriation claims immediately; rather, MIGA mandates a 
waiting period of 180 days before recognizing claims for expropriation of 
investment.76 This waiting period is likely a time when the investor and 
MIGA make all possible efforts to recover the loss from the host 
government in accordance with Article 12.5 of the insurance contract.77 
 
 72.  Performance Standards, MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR. AGENCY, http://www.miga.org/projects/ 
index.cfm?stid=1828 (last visited May 17, 2015). The substance of the International Finance 
Corporation’s Guidance Notes on meeting these performance standards gives a detailed explanation of 
how companies can achieve them. Performance Standards and Guidance Notes, INT’L FIN. CORP. (Apr. 
30, 2006), available at http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_ 
corporate_site/ifc+sustainability/our+approach/risk+management/performance+standards/environmenta
l+and+social+performance+standards+and+guidance+notes#2012 [hereinafter IFC Notes]. 
 73.  IFC Notes, supra note 72, ¶ 19. 
 74.  MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR. AGENCY, CONTRACT FOR GUARANTEE OF EQUITY INVESTMENTS 
art. 4.1(a) (Aug. 5, 2013), available at http://www.miga.org/documents/disclosure/Contract%20of%20 
Guarantee%20for%20Equity%20Investments.pdf [hereinafter MIGA Model Contract]. 
 75.  See Bekker & Ogawa, supra note 23, at 328–330. 
 76.  MIGA Model Contract, supra note 74, art. 2 (defining waiting period). 
 77.  Id. art. 12.5 (mandating that the investor work with MIGA to “(a) pursue available 
administrative and judicial remedies arising from the Loss, in cooperation with or on behalf of MIGA, 
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If MIGA does pay compensation to the insured investor, the investor 
might be disappointed with the value MIGA provides when compared 
against that of arbitral tribunals. This is because MIGA calculates 
compensation based on the “book value” of the investment,78 which 
explicitly excludes the goodwill of the company and is calculated strictly 
on a basis of assets minus liabilities.79  Thus, if an investor is building a 
company which requires developing substantial goodwill before harvesting 
a loyal consumer base over time, or if an investor expects the company’s 
profits to grow exponentially in future years, an expropriation followed by 
a MIGA payout at book value might be very unsatisfactory.  The 
discounted cash flow method of valuation employed by most arbitral 
tribunals would likely compensate investors more fully.80 
The Berne Union, a club of 79 public and private insurance agencies, 
dedicates itself to promoting and providing a forum for establishing 
industry-wide best practices.81  The public and private players “meet on a 
regular basis to discuss industry trends and challenges.”82  The Union also 
nurtures newly-established insurance companies by providing support 
through the Prague Club,83 which contributes to the Berne Union’s goal 
of ”actively facilitate[ing] cross-border trade by supporting international 
acceptance of sound principles in . . . foreign investment.”84 
C. Private PRI 
This Section discusses the role of private players in the PRI market.  
Private insurers play a vital role in supplementing the capacity of public 
insurers to offer PRI to clients. Private insurers can offer attractive policies 
in the private market or collaborate with public insurers in the reinsurance 
market.  Because the quality of private PRI is stimulating demand for it 
“across all political risks,”85 it is necessary for investors to understand the 
 
against the Host Government; (b) negotiate in good faith with the Host Government, in cooperation 
with or on behalf of MIGA; and (c) pursue other potential sources of recovery for the Loss.”). 
 78.  Id. art. 4.4 (“[C]ompensation payable under Expropriation shall be the Percentage of Cover 
of . . . the Net Book Value of the Project Enterprise . . . .”). 
 79.  Id. art. 2 (defining net book value). 
 80.  The discounted cash flow method would compensate investors for future incomes lost, not 
simply the net book value. 
 81.  About the Berne Union, BERNE UNION (2015), http://www.berneunion.org/about-the-berne-
union/. 
 82.  MIGA 2012 Political Risk Report, supra note 12, at 80. 
 83.  BERNE UNION, supra note 81. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  See MIGA 2012 Political Risk Report, supra note 12, at 43 (“In a July 2012 roundtable of 
private insurers and brokers from the London insurance market . . . participants noted an increase in 
demand for PRI across all political risks.”). 
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landscape of the private PRI market before formulating a risk mitigation 
strategy. 
The company of Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., for example, is a typical 
private insurer.  It does business in over 110 countries and offers the “most 
competitive and appropriate terms” for its insurance policies.86  It ranks 
countries numerically on a risk scale with nine categories ranging from 
insignificant and low risk (e.g. Poland) to very high or extreme risk (e.g. 
Yemen).87  The premiums for its policies are then based on a country’s 
ranking.  It offers policies covering every major type of political risk.88  It 
prides itself on not being bound by any insurance template; instead, it is 
committed to going beyond the traditional transactional brokering and 
offering “innovative insurance solutions” to its clients.89 
In general, the private insurance market offers policies for shorter 
terms and for smaller amounts than their public counterparts.  In Arthur J. 
Gallagher’s market capacity report, it indicates that the majority of PRI 
available is for terms of three to five years totaling just over $3 billion in 
capacity while having only barely $1 billion in capacity for terms of ten to 
fifteen years,90 perhaps indicating less of an appetite for long-term risk.  
Additionally, most private players only insure an investment for less than 
$100 million,91 though larger players such as the American Insurance 
Group (AIG) offers PRI for investments up to $120 million.92  Whereas 
public insurers such as OPIC are backed by the full faith and credit of the 
United States, and thus are likely able to withstand substantial losses for 
investments-gone-bad, private insurers must compete with one another in 
the private marketplace, where any ratings downgrades may potentially 
impede their ability to attract clients.93 
Despite the apparent diminished appetite of private insurers in terms 
of amount of coverage and policy term lengths, insurance claims have 
increased over the past two years and have “tended to be paid out more by 
private than by public providers.”94  The track record of recovering money 
from host governments has been poor by both public and private insurers, 
 
 86.  GALLAGHER LONDON, PRI REPORT AND MARKET UPDATE 15 (2013), available at 
http://www.ajginternational.com/assets/Uploads/Publications/Gallagher-London-PRI-Report-Market-
Update-Jan-2013.pdf. 
 87.  Id. at 12–14. 
 88.  See id. at 15 (offering policies covering political violence, war, currency transfer, etc.). 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 8. 
 91.  Many insurers only cover up to $20 million of investment. Id. at 4–6. 
 92.  Id. at 4. 
 93.  Id. at 3 (publicizing the downgrades of two major insurance companies) 
 94.  MIGA 2012 Political Risk Report, supra note 12, at 40 (emphasis added). 
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though it is “unpredictable” if or when an insurance company will 
recover.95  The higher payout rates of private insurers could be for several 
reasons.  It could, for instance, indicate that the private market is willing to 
cover riskier investments than MIGA, albeit covering those risky 
investments for short timeframes and for lower amounts. 
The private and public markets are also interconnected in the 
reinsurance markets.  In this way, the public and private insurers should not 
be seen so much as competitors but as complements.  MIGA, for example, 
received reinsurance coverage through twenty-seven public and private 
providers as of 2012.96  MIGA itself provided reinsurance coverage to two 
investment insurers in Belgium and Slovenia in 2012 alone.97  NEXI also 
has reinsurance agreements with the export credit agencies of Hong Kong, 
Canada, and Indonesia.98  The result, then, is that the PRI markets are not 
as focused on cutthroat competition as they are on providing insurance and 
reinsurance for clients that are investing ever-greater sums in risky 
countries.  The collaborative spirit in the PRI market allows public and 
private players to reinsure one another to diversify their risks across 
different geographic regions and industries. 
II. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE POLICIES 
A. The advantages and disadvantages of public PRI 
From an actuarial perspective, when deciding to issue an insurance 
policy, the issuer should, in theory, consider the following equation 
representing the expected payout of the insurance policy over time, where 
pi represents the probability of a payout event occurring in year i, ai 
represents the expected value of a payout in year i, and r is the discount 
rate.  Over the lifetime of a project with a duration of n years, the insurer’s 





(1 + ݎ)௜ 
It is important to note that the expected payout is not the actual payout 
 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR. AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 2012 115 (2012), available at 
http://www.miga.org/documents/AR2012_English.pdf. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  See Message from the Chairman, supra note 55. 
 99.  The formulas in this paper are the author’s own. They are not intended to be a comprehensive 
representation of insurance pricing policy, but rather simplified formulas to illustrate key concepts 
useful in distinguishing public and private policies. 
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of the insurer.  The formula encapsulates the insurer’s overall exposure to 
risk over the life of a project.  The actual payout could be much higher or 
lower, depending on the claim.  It should be an uncontroversial assertion 
that risk profiles may vary widely for different countries, thus influencing 
the pi for the calculation.  It is thus logical that insurance premiums vary 
“depending on the particular risk profile of the project” and that any public 
rates “could be adjusted” to account for certain circumstances.100 
The insurer should charge a premium that at least suffices to cover 
both the expected payout and a profit load.  Hence, the premium charged to 





(1 + ݎ)௜ + ݌ݎ݋݂݅ݐ	݈݋ܽ݀ 
The above theoretical formula only instructs the policy issuer on the 
total amount of premiums that should be charged to adequately cover its 
risk exposure and earn a profit.  Exactly how the premiums should be 
distributed over the lifetime of a project is a matter of contract and the risks 
expected by the insurer.  If an insurer anticipates the highest risk of 
expropriation to occur within the first five years of a project’s life, it could 
and should frontload the premiums to adequately cover its risk.  If the risk 
will remain relatively constant over the project’s lifetime, a greater 
inclination exists to spread the premiums evenly over time. 
It is not difficult to see why public insurers have two primary cost 
advantages over private insurers: (1) greater access to information to better 
predict pi,101 and (2) no pressure to make profit, which could potentially 
push the profit load to zero for a policyholder.  First, public insurers such 
as OPIC are guided by the U.S. State Department, receiving assistance in 
forming its policy objectives102 and broader intelligence about the actions 
of host-state actors and their intent.103  The intelligence that the State 
 
 100.  Indicative Rates, OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. CORP., http://www.opic.gov/what-we-
offer/political-risk-insurance/indicative-rates (last visited May 17, 2015). 
 101.  For purposes of discussion, this paper assumes that pi can be foreseen with some measure of 
certainty. There is, however, “a growing realization that political risk events are not easily predictable.”  
MIGA 2012 Political Risk Report, supra note 12, at 42. 
 102.  22 U.S.C. § 2191 (describing that OPIC “shall be an agency of the United States under the 
policy guidance of the Secretary of State”). 
 103.  See Jennifer M. DeLeonardo, Note, Are Public and Private Political Risk Insurance Two of A 
Kind? Suggestions for A New Direction for Government Coverage, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 737, 752 (2005) 
(“Part of OPIC’s purpose was to capitalize on the U.S. government’s substantial investment in gaining 
less readily available information about foreign parties by using it to effectively grade risk.”). The U.S. 
government can, for instance, know when “in negotiations between states, a government might indicate 
its intent to encourage a business environment favorable to private investment.”  Id. at 751–52.  
However, there has been a rise in private consulting firms that help to counteract the information 
asymmetry.  Id. at 753–54.  Nonetheless, private consultants may not have ready access to confidential 
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Department shares with OPIC based on its leadership analysts, political 
analysts, and economic analysts all contribute to give it a distinct advantage 
over private actors in determining pi. In fact, OPIC works “in close 
consultation” with the State Department before making a final 
commitment.104  It is true that the signing of BITs by host governments acts 
as a signal in lessening the information gap between the public and private 
sector,105 but it still remains that OPIC can rely on its worldwide support 
network of U.S. embassy staffers in assessing risk.  This intelligence helps 
OPIC set premiums high when necessary to cover its risk and lower 
premiums when possible to be the low-cost provider. The evidence 
confirms that public insurance premiums are generally lower than those in 
the private sector.106 
Second, public entities often have a statutory mandate to operate on at 
least a break-even basis with no pressure to make profit, which has the 
ability to reduce the profit load on a contract to almost zero.  This policy 
contrasts with publicly-traded insurance companies offering PRI that have 
fiduciary duties to their shareholders to pursue profits.  Furthermore, the 
focus of public entities like OPIC on promoting small businesses makes 
PRI available to small entities that might be forced out of the market for 
private PRI by the transaction costs of brokering insurance for a small 
investment.  Public entities, therefore, offer major advantages to investors, 
especially to small investors. 
Public insurers may also be able to factor in a lower pi in calculating 
premiums because they can use the force of government backing.  If the 
host government, for example, fears negative repercussions from the U.S. 
government, it may not expropriate an OPIC-insured investment.  There 
may also be private discussions with the host government at the first sign of 
an expropriation in which the insuring government or multilateral agency 
attempts to stiff-arm the host government into foregoing expropriation.  
Skeptics of this effect are likely to argue that publicly documented 
examples of a host government’s negotiation with PRI insurers are few and 
far between,107 and thus that public insurers maintain no advantage over the 
 
interactions between public actors. 
 104. Worker & Human Rights, OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. CORP., http://www.opic.gov/doing-
business-us/OPIC-policies/worker-human-rights (last visited May 17, 2015). 
 105.  Bekker & Ogawa, supra note 23, at 339 (“[A] host state’s willingness to conclude a BIT and 
join an international arbitration convention publicly demonstrates that it has committed to fostering a 
positive business environment.”). 
 106.  Id. at 323 n.73. 
 107. The lack of publicly available information is unsurprising, as the majority of PRI claims and 
the negotiation processes behind them are confidential. See Robert Ginsburg, Political Risk Insurance 
and Bilateral Investment Treaties: Making the Connection, THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT AND 
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private sector in negotiating with host governments.  But this argument 
fails to address the inherent deterrent effect that comes from being insured 
by the U.S. government or the World Bank, resulting in expropriations that 
never even materialize. 
Indeed, an analysis of the MIGA model contract reveals that it is 
structured to allow MIGA to use its political clout to potentially prevent or 
minimize an investment loss.  Article 12.1(g) requires the policyholder to 
“immediately notify MIGA in writing upon learning of any event or 
circumstance that could cause, or materially increase the likelihood of, a 
Loss.”108  This article essentially allows MIGA to preemptively try to 
prevent a host government action, such as a piece of legislation, that could 
result in a loss to the investor.  Article 12.1(i) mandates that the investor, 
too, take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent an investment loss.109  
Article 11 also subrogates MIGA to the claims of the investor once MIGA 
has paid the investor for its loss, allowing MIGA to attempt to recover at 
least part of the loss from the host government.110 
Investors must weigh the advantages of being publicly insured, 
however, with the potential disadvantages of public insurance.  Investors 
taking out an OPIC insurance policy must comply, for example, with a 
laundry list of social and environmental conditions.  Investors must 
explicitly guarantee a right to collective bargaining and a right to 
association for workers in every contract they sign.111  Investors in certain 
projects must submit an Environmental Impact Assessment to demonstrate 
their compliance with OPIC standards as well as conduct a variety of 
analyses to ensure compliance.112 
MIGA imposes similar conditions.  Article 12.1(m) of the model 
contract gives MIGA free reign to monitor an investment’s compliance 
with environmental and social development standards,113 and it imposes a 
burden on the investor to provide MIGA with a comprehensive set of 
Development Effectiveness Indicators three years after the initial 
 
TRADE, 943, 950 n.19 (2013) (“While the majority of PRI claims processes are confidential, host 
government’s decisions to settle a claim or honor an arbitral award are often made available to the 
public. For this reason, host governments will consider political consequences as well as the merits of 
the investors’ claims.”). 
 108.  MIGA Model Contract, supra note 74, art. 12.1(g). 
 109.  Id. art. 12.1(i). 
 110.  Id. art. 11. 
 111.  OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. CORP., ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL POLICY STATEMENT ¶ 6.3 
(2010), available at http://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/consolidated_esps.pdf. 
 112.  OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. CORP., ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK 5 (2004), available at 
http://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/docs/opic_env_handbook.pdf. 
 113.  MIGA Model Contract, supra note 74, art. 12.1(m). 
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investment.114  If the investor fails to comply with any environmental 
guidelines, and this failure can be linked to the investment loss, MIGA will 
not pay a claim by the investor.115  Hence, a situation could arise in which a 
host government claims that it must pass strong environmental legislation 
to combat unacceptable levels of pollution by the investor, resulting in 
what the investor sees as an indirect expropriation.  If MIGA discovers 
evidence on non-compliance with its environmental guidelines, the investor 
will not be able to recover under its insurance policy.  MIGA also has 
information-gathering powers over the investor; the model contract 
mandates that the investor give MIGA free reign to examine the 
investment,116 as well as furnish MIGA with any information it reasonably 
requests.117 
Perhaps due in part to these requirements, a full 48% of investors 
seeking PRI choose to purchase it through the private sector.118  An 
opposing point of view could be that social and environmental regulations 
actually help investors by helping them maintain a positive rapport with the 
local community.  Even assuming the correctness of this assertion, 
however, does nothing to diminish the burdensome costs associated with 
actually proving compliance,119 which can be a time-consuming, resource-
intensive process.  Investors receiving OPIC insurance must endure an 
analysis by OPIC’s Office of Investment Policy to ensure compliance with 
all relevant standards,120 and withstand onerous monitoring.  Purchasing 
insurance through the private sector would thus allow an investor to gain 
the benefits of compliance with social and environmental standards while 
eliminating, or at least potentially reducing, the costs of proving that 
compliance to a third party. 
B. The advantages and disadvantages of private PRI 
The first inherent advantage of private PRI is that it is available to 
every investor looking to purchase it.  While some investments may be 
especially risky, such as those invested in countries without BITs or with 
countries that would refuse to sign an investment protection agreement 
 
 114.  Id. art. 12.1(n). 
 115.  Id. art. 9.1. 
 116.  Id. art. 12.1(j). 
 117.  Id. art. 12.1(b). 
 118.  Bekker & Ogawa, supra note 23, at 337. 
 119.  Investors purchasing PRI through the private sector could obtain the benefits of compliance 
with the regulations without having to invest the resources to prove their compliance to a third party. 
 120.  See generally Project Monitoring, OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. CORP., http://www.opic.gov/ 
doing-business-us/OPIC-policies/project-monitoring (last visited May 17, 2015). 
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with an insurer (thus eliminating eligibility to obtain MIGA insurance, for 
example), private insurance companies do not categorically prohibit 
offering PRI policies to these risky investments, though they may be 
subject to higher premiums.  Private insurance thus provides a fallback for 
high-risk investments that nonetheless possess a reasonable risk-reward 
ratio, especially if the private sector can reduce premiums as much as 
possible by strategically obtaining reinsurance from a variety of actors to 
reduce its risk exposure. 
Perhaps more importantly, an analysis of the policies of national 
agencies such as OPIC reveals that private PRI fills important gaps in the 
industry as a result of national governments’ imposition of social and 
environmental conditions. OPIC’s economic policies, for example, prohibit 
it from providing insurance to a project that eliminates U.S. employment 
and moves production overseas.121  OPIC’s environmental guidelines also 
prohibit it from assisting projects that “require resettlement” of more than 
5,000 inhabitants.122  Similarly prohibited are infrastructure investments 
that disrupt rainforests.123  Although these investments may not garner the 
emotional salience that more compassionate investments garner, it is 
nonetheless true that they could have long-term economic benefits for host 
countries.  Private PRI policies allow investors that want coverage to rest 
assured they will not be subject to a categorical prohibition.  For instance, a 
small-town textile company in Asheboro, North Carolina, that moves some 
of its operations to the Dominican Republic and El Salvador to increase its 
competitive advantage would have to rely on the private PRI market to 
purchase insurance.124  Similarly, a company building a highway that 
displaces more than 5,000 people, or an airport that impacts a rainforest 
habitat, would also likely have to resort to the private market for insurance.  
Plus, for those investors with existing investments that they want to insure, 
private PRI may be the best option, and in some cases the only option.125  
 
 121.  See Economic Analysis, OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. CORP., www.opic.gov/doing-business-
us/OPIC-policies/economic-analysis (last visited May 17, 2015) (“The main prohibition covers any 
project that intends to reduce or eliminate U.S. operations by moving production overseas.”). All 
categorical prohibitions apply to lenders as well as investors. See also ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL 
POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 111, ¶ 3.32 (“No Financial Intermediary may use proceeds from any 
loan made or guaranteed by OPIC for the purpose of investing in or lending to an entity engaged in a 
Categorically Prohibited Project.”). 
 122.  OPIC ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK, supra note 112, at 44. 
 123.  Id. at 7. 
 124.  See Our Plants, ASHEBORO ELASTICS CORP., http://www.aecnarrowfabrics.com/about-
aec/our-plants (last visited Mar. 12, 2015) (indicating that Asheboro Elastics Corporation, a family-
owned business in rural North Carolina, has now grown to have production facilities in El Salvador and 
Honduras, with distribution centers across the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Nicaragua). 
 125.  Private insurers have more interest in covering existing investments than public insurers. See 
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Private PRI, therefore, may offer insurance to projects left out in the cold 
by OPIC. 
In addition to filling gaps in the PRI market, a second advantage of 
private PRI is that it can be more quickly and efficiently tailored to an 
investor’s specifications.  Private PRI providers can generally procure 
policies more quickly than their public counterparts, resulting in time 
savings to an investor.126  Investors can also negotiate more favorable, 
albeit more costly, coverage.  If an investor, for example, desires to insure 
an investment based on the more favorable discounted cash flow method 
instead of book value, it can negotiate a contract to do so with a set 
discount rate and established metrics with which to estimate future cash 
flows.  Similarly, if an investor does not want to absorb a full 10% of any 
loss, he could potentially purchase a policy with higher coverage in the 
private market, or supplement his public PRI policy with a private policy 
for the remaining 10%. 
Private PRI providers are also better positioned to offer global risk 
policies.  Piracy, war, and terrorism are becoming ever-more global, and an 
inability to know where the next coup or terror attack will occur has 
prompted interest amongst investors for global insurance policies.127  Of 
course, globalized policies would be more costly as a result of covering 
more geographic risk, but there could be substantial transaction cost 
savings from such a policy relative to an individual policy negotiated for 
each specific country.  The private PRI market could be the launching pad 
for such a policy because it is not constrained by social and environmental 
evaluation requirements, or by a requirement that a country have a BIT or 
some other form of legal protection agreement for the investor. 
Despite the advantages of private PRI, it faces at least two drawbacks.  
First, the private PRI market is more subject to capacity fluctuations than 
public entities.  Periods in which credit markets are tight lead to increased 
difficulty in obtaining insurance from private providers. During the heart of 
the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, the growth in total coverage provided 
by public providers increased much faster than that of private providers.128  
Laws governing cash reserve requirements for insurance companies can 
 
MIGA 2012 Political Risk Report, supra note 12, at 46 (“For example, the events in the Middle East 
and North Africa region have engendered an interest for coverage of existing investments, despite the 
historical requirement of many public providers to cover only new investments.”). 
 126.  See Bekker & Ogawa, supra note 23, at 323 (noting that private insurers are often “speedier” 
and can offer “more tailored” policies). 
 127.  See MIGA 2012 Political Risk Report, supra note 12, at 47 (“[T]here has also been an 
increase in demand for global policies that encompass all risks. With uncertainty as to where the next 
political risk ‘event’ will occur, there seems to be an increased interest in global PRI coverage.”). 
 128.  Id. at 43. 
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also impact PRI availability.129 
Second, an investor purchasing a private PRI policy loses the deterrent 
effect that public insurers carry.  This deterrent effect would presumably be 
less important, however, for investors concerned with political violence 
rather than expropriation.  Expropriation—an intentional act by a host 
government—might be deterred by the prospect of engendering hostility 
with the World Bank or the U.S. government.  By contrast, independent, 
uncontrollable bands of rebels causing political violence are not likely 
influenced or even aware of such indirect repercussions of their actions. 
III. TOWARD A COST-EFFECTIVE RISK MITIGATION STRATEGY 
FOR INVESTORS 
A. Purchasing public insurance is favorable to private insurance 
Despite the advantages of private insurance,130 investors should prefer 
public insurance.  National agencies such as OPIC have spent decades 
building goodwill with developing-country communities.131  American 
investors, for example, should highly value the reputation that OPIC holds 
in developing countries, as governments are oftentimes concerned with 
their reputations when engaging in activity that could be considered 
expropriation.132  The backing of OPIC and the pressure that OPIC can 
potentially put on host governments not to expropriate should be of high 
value to investors, especially investors that might be prone to expropriation 
risk, such as oil companies, canal operators, or mining companies. 
One may reasonably argue that investors should purchase private PRI 
because the net book value valuation method used by public insurers will 
not adequately compensate them for the investment loss. While this is true, 
nothing appears to prevent the investor from seeking additional 
compensation from an arbitral tribunal in the amount of the difference 
 
 129.  See id. at 40 (“[T]he PRI market is influenced by developments in the general 
(property/casualty) and life insurance industry . . . . [N]ew capital requirements contemplated by [new 
regulations] are expected to be met easily.”). 
 130.  See supra Part II.B. 
 131.  See, e.g., OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. CORP., OPIC-SUPPORTED U.S. INVESTMENT IN CENTRAL 
AMERICA HELPS REGION MEET DEVELOPMENTAL NEEDS (2007), available at http://permanent.access. 
gpo.gov/lps81122/central_america0307.pdf (noting remarkable achievements by OPIC and OPIC-
supported businesses to contribute to societal development in Central America). 
 132.  See Roderick Duncan, Costs and Consequences of the Expropriation of FDI by Host 
Governments, COLLECTION OF THE AUSTRALIAN AGRIC. & RES. ECON. SOC’Y tbl. 2 (2006), available 
at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/handle/139524 (providing empirical evidence supporting the assertion 
and expropriations lower the reputations of governments amongst investors, though it can be regained 
through de-expropriation). 
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between the discounted cash flow valuation and the net book value.  In fact, 
investors that possess the support of agencies such as OPIC could have a 
greater chance of succeeding in arbitration. 
Even if investors are intimidated by the public insurers’ social and 
environmental requirements, they should still strongly consider purchasing 
insurance for their investment.  Whatever costs investors incur meeting 
their social obligations could be recouped through intangible benefits from 
improved community relations and increased shareholder confidence 
necessary to pursue their investment objectives aggressively.  As for 
tangible benefits, investors paying PRI premiums could be able to recoup 
some of the cost in the form of lower interest rates from lenders due to the 
fact that major political risks are shifted out of the company and onto the 
insurer.133 In sum, the intangible and tangible benefits of public insurance, 
as well as the potential deterrent effect against host governments, should 
cause investors to think twice before foregoing a public PRI policy. 
B. Lowering insurance premiums through strategic engagement with host 
communities and host governments 
As previously discussed, an investor can lower the amount of its 
insurance premiums primarily by either reducing (1) the amount of an 
investment loss in the event of a claim (ܽ௜), or (2) the probability of an 
investment loss (݌௜).134  Strategic engagement with host communities and 
host governments can potentially lower both of these variables. 
First, engaging host governments could lower the amount of an 
investment loss in the event of a covered host-government action.  
Investors could enter into agreements with host governments to set aside 
host-government funds into an escrow account to be released to the 
investor in the event of expropriation or other damages from political 
violence.  Some scholars have recommended escrow accounts as risk 
mitigation tools.135  The exact amount in escrow, as well as the period of 
time it would be held in escrow, would be negotiated by the investors and 
governments.  The amount could be large, such as enough to cover a 
portion of an investment loss, or the amount could be just small enough to 
cover arbitration costs in the event of arbitration in which the host state 
loses.  Oftentimes, no single tool can cover all risks,136 so investors should 
 
 133.  This benefit would also be present with a private PRI policy. 
 134.  See supra Part II.A. 
 135.  RAZAVI, supra note 22, at 132. 
 136.  Id. at 131 (“Often, project sponsors combine several guarantees to ensure sufficient protection 
against political risks.”). 
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consider a variety of ways in which they can combine PRI policies with 
other contractual solutions to reduce risk.  The availability of escrow 
accounts may be limited to investors performing critical services for a 
country, such as infrastructure projects, as they would be the only investors 
with enough leverage to potentially extract such a concession. 
Investors can also reduce ݌௜ by forming healthy working relationships 
with host governments.  Investors currently rank engagement with host 
governments and contributions supporting “well-connected political 
figure[s]” as among some of their top risk mitigation strategies.137  This 
seems intuitive, as open channels of communication between government 
leaders and investors would allow investors to address any host-
government concerns sooner rather than later.  Investors might also 
consider quarterly or semiannual meetings with host government leaders to 
keep them apprised of the company’s activities. 
Second, investors can strategically engage their host communities to 
reduce ݌௜.  Popular risk mitigation strategies include forming an “alliance 
with [a] local company” and “invest[ing] gradually while developing 
familiarity with the local environment.”138  In addition, investors can build 
goodwill in their host communities by engaging in innovative social 
programs with host governments and local workers.139  Building support 
among local businesses and populations can thus be an effective 
mechanism for controlling risk and lowering insurance premiums.140 
CONCLUSION 
No investor-company can completely immunize itself from the 
potential political risks inherent in investing in developing countries.  As 
such, investors are increasingly turning to PRI to protect their investments.  
While public entities have traditionally filled this need, private players are 
increasingly participating in the PRI industry. 
Investors tasked with selecting a PRI option face wide-ranging 
 
 137.  MIGA 2012 Political Risk Report, supra note 12, at 10, fig.3. 
 138.   Id. 
 139.  See, e.g., “Food for the People” Program for Workers at Free Zones, COMISIÓN NACIONAL 
DE ZONAS FRANCAS, http://www.cnzf.gob.ni/?q=en/news/food-people%E2%80%9D-program-workers-
free-zones (last visited Mar. 12, 2015) (describing the provision of subsidized food, among other 
benefits, to local workers by foreign investors in Nicaragua in collaboration with the Nicaraguan 
government). 
 140.   PRI purchases are generally made before an investment is made, making it difficult for the 
investor to predict that it will be able to achieve goodwill in the host communities and thus should be 
charged lower premiums.  However, a strong track record of host community and business cooperation 
could be persuasive in negotiating premiums for new investments in the same country, or expansions of 
existing investments. 
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options, each with distinct advantages and disadvantages.  Which PRI 
option best fits an investor’s needs depends on various circumstances.  An 
investor that values speed and does not wish to be monitored for 
compliance with social and environmental standards would likely prefer a 
private PRI policy, whereas an investor concerned particularly with 
expropriation risk who values the deterrent effect of the World Bank’s 
backing would likely opt for a MIGA PRI policy.  Furthermore, there may 
be some investors for whom the decision of which policy to purchase is 
pre-determined, since those investors face categorical prohibitions from 
national agencies. 
Despite the advantages and disadvantages of each type of PRI policy, 
investors should attempt, if possible, to purchase a public PRI policy to 
reap the benefits of lower premiums and increased leverage when 
negotiating with host governments.  Investors can also safeguard their 
investment and potentially lower their PRI premiums by engaging 
strategically with host communities and host governments to reduce the 
probability of an investment loss.  With these risk mitigation tools, the 
upward trend of foreign investment in developing countries will hopefully 
continue to increase, perhaps even at a more rapid rate—as will the 
corresponding societal benefits that accrue to host communities. 
 
